An Implemented Formalism for Computing Linguistic Presuppositions and
  Existential Commitments by Marcu, Daniel & Hirst, Graeme
ar
X
iv
:c
m
p-
lg
/9
50
40
18
v1
  2
6 
A
pr
 1
99
5 An Implemented Formalism for Computing Linguistic
Presuppositions and Existential Commitments
Daniel Marcu and Graeme Hirst
Department of Computer Science
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5S 1A4
{marcu,gh}@cs.toronto.edu
November 11, 2018
Abstract
We rely on the strength of linguistic and philosophical perspectives in constructing a
framework that offers a unified explanation for presuppositions and existential commitment.
We use a rich ontology and a set of methodological principles that embed the essence of
Meinong’s philosophy and Grice’s conversational principles into a stratified logic, under an
unrestricted interpretation of the quantifiers. The result is a logical formalism that yields a
tractable computational method that uniformly calculates all the presuppositions of a given
utterance, including the existential ones.
1. Introduction
It is common knowledge that a rational agent is
inclined to presuppose the existence of definite
references that occur in utterances. Hearing or
uttering the examples below, a rational agent pre-
supposes that the cheese, children, and car phys-
ically exist.
(1) The cheese I bought yesterday is very
bad.
(2) I really don’t know what to do with my
children anymore.
(3) Sorry I couldn’t make it; my car broke on
my way.
However, day-to-day English provides an im-
pressive number of cases when existential pre-
suppositions are not inferred, or when they
are defeated by some commonsense knowledge
(see [Hirst, 1991] for a comprehensive study).
One can explicitly speak of nonexistence (4);
events and actions that do not occur (5); exis-
tence at other times (6); or fictional and imagi-
nary objects (7).
(4) No one got an A+ in this course.
(5) John’s party is cancelled.
(6) Go¨del was a brilliant mathematician.
(7) Sherlock Holmes is smarter than any
other detective.
Note that the simple dichotomy found in most ap-
proaches to presupposition between existent and
nonexistent objects is not enough for a full ac-
count of natural language expressiveness.
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The study of presuppositions is primarily a
study of commitment — commitment to the ex-
istence of presupposed definite referents or to the
truth of factive complements. The reduction of
presupposition to entailment is inadequate be-
cause presuppositions are implied, not specified;
they are not part of the truth conditions of natu-
ral language sentences, and they can be cancelled
in negative environments. Trying to explain the
whole phenomenon and to provide solutions for
the projection problem, linguists have often omit-
ted any explanation for the existential commit-
ment of definite references or their explanation
has been a superficial one. Similarly, philosophers
who have studied existence and nonexistence have
been more concerned with providing formal tools
for manipulation of nonexistent objects than tools
to capture our commonsense commitment. This
puts us in a difficult position. From a linguistic
perspective, the literature provides a good set of
theories able to more or less explain the commit-
ment to the presupposed truth of factives and the
like but not the existential commitment of defi-
nite references. From a philosophical perspective,
we have quite a few theories which deal with ex-
istence and nonexistence, but they too offer no
explanation for existential commitment.
Our aim here is to provide a formalism that
has the strength of both perspectives. We achieve
this using the following:
• a set of methodological principles that
unify Meinong’s [1904] philosophy with
Grice’s [1975] conversational principles;
• a rich ontology in the style of Hirst [1991],
which provides the possibility of having
consistent models that contain objects
belonging to different ontological spaces;
• an extension of stratified logic [Marcu, 1994]
where the quantifiers are read under
Lejewski’s [1954] “unrestricted interpre-
tation”, which provides us the formal tool
for expressing the above layers.
The implementation relies on an ex-
tension of the Beth semantic tableaux to
stratified logic. The code is written in
Common Lisp and makes extensive use
of the nondeterministic facilities of the
Screamer system [Siskind and McAllester, 1993a,
Siskind and McAllester, 1993b].
We first review the philosophical approaches
in studying existence and nonexistence and the
linguistic approaches in studying presuppositions,
emphasizing their (in)ability to deal with presup-
positions and nonexistence respectively. We give
a brief introduction to stratified logic, its imple-
mentation, and explain the methodological prin-
ciples of our approach. In section 4 we show how
this approach is able not only to deal with nonex-
istence but also able to explain the existential
commitment of definite reference. The rest of the
paper is dedicated to a comparison with Parsons’s
and Hobbs’s work.
2. What philosophers and linguists
have to say
2.1. Nonexistence and commitment in phi-
losophy and logic
Early works of Frege [1892] and Russell [1905]
tackled a very small subset of what today is
labelled with the name “presupposition”: the
presuppositions introduced by definite references
and proper names. Hirst [1991] shows that clas-
sical logic, which embeds Quine’s metaphysi-
cal view [Quine, 1949, p.150] that “everything
exists”, is not able to deal adequately with
nonexistent objects. For example, if one knows
that dragons do not exist — (∀x)(¬dragon(x))
— it is impossible to distinguish between My
dragon has blue eyes and My dragon does not
have blue eyes because both translations in first-
order logic are false: (∃x)(dragon(x) ∧ my(x) ∧
[¬]has blue eyes(x)). Therefore, first-order logic
is doomed to fail in any attempt to reflect the
presuppositions of definite references.
Several approaches to nonexistence
rely on Meinong’s mental act philoso-
phy [Meinong, 1904]. For example, Par-
sons [1980] avoids Russell’s paraphrase of the
definite description by using the predicateE!. For
Parsons, (ιx)Φ refers to the unique object that
satisfies Φ if there is such an object. Otherwise,
it does not refer to anything at all. For a sen-
tence such as “The man in the doorway is clever”,
Parsons [1980, p.114] argues that the translation
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(ιx)((man(x) ∧ in the doorway(x)) ∧ clever(x))
is not adequate because it does not reflect our
commitment to the man’s existence. There-
fore, he proposes that the translation should
be (ιx)((E!(x) ∧man(x) ∧ in the doorway(x)) ∧
clever(x)) where E! is the existential predicate.
But the problem with this is that it embeds the
existential commitment in the logical translation
— not as something that is “implied” or presup-
posed, but as something “said” or specified. This
is not the case with linguistic presuppositions.
Thus, the first translation is too weak — un-
able to capture the commitment, and the second
one is too strong — the commitment becomes
part of the translation and leaves no room for
cancellation of presupposition.
Outside Meinong’s world, we find other ap-
proaches that focus on the appropriate reading
of the quantifiers. Lejewski [1954] and Hin-
tikka [1959] both propose an “unrestricted in-
terpretation” of the quantifiers, which makes no
commitment to the existence of the objects over
which they range. Under this interpretation, ex-
istence can be predicated (Lejewski), or explicitly
captured as (∃x)(x = a) (Hintikka). The latter
solution is nothing but a translation into logic of
Quine’s slogan, “to exist is to be the value of a
variable”. In these universes, we are free now to
talk about Pegasus and dragons but we cannot
explain our commitment to the existence of the
definite referents.
An interesting approach towards explaining
the conditions in which existential presupposi-
tions are generated is built by Atlas [1988] around
the notions of “aboutness” and “noun-phrase top-
icality”. Instead of allowing all the noun-phrases
in a sentence to exhibit presupposition genera-
tion capabilities, only the topical ones enjoy this
property. Atlas gives no hint of how this theory
could be extended to deal with factives or verbs
of judging, and defining the notions of aboutness
and topicality for them is not trivial. Even if we
did manage to do this, such presuppositions can
never be cancelled. Either they are generated or
they are not. This leads us to believe that sen-
tences such as John didn’t stop beating the rug
because he never started cannot be captured in
this manner.
Hobbs [1985] uses the “unrestricted interpre-
tation” of the quantifiers introduced by Lejew-
ski [1954]. Hence, in Hobbs’s framework, the set
of things we can talk about (including, therefore,
nonexistent things) and the set of things we quan-
tify over are equal. The existential commitment
is captured by a set of “transparency axioms”.
For example, the sentence Ross worships Zeus is
represented as:
worship′(E,Ross, Zeus) ∧Exist(E)
The first conjunct says that E is the event of wor-
shipping Zeus by Ross, and the second says that
E exists in the real world. Hobbs assigns a trans-
parency property to the predicates. For worship′,
this property entails the existence of its second
argument in the physical world:
∀E∀x∀y((worship′(E, x, y) ∧ Exist(E))
→ Exist(x))
Apparently, the commitment to Ross’s exis-
tence is solved. Worship′ is transparent in its
second argument but not in its third; so we may
infer that Ross is existent, but draw no conclu-
sions about Zeus. The problem is that the trans-
parency axioms are associated with the predicates
and not with the objects, so that there is no cri-
terion to choose an appropriate translation for a
sentence like The King of Buganda worships Zeus
because the translation should be transparent if
we know nothing about Buganda and opaque oth-
erwise.
2.2. Theories of linguistic presupposition
and their relation to (non)existence
The vast majority of the linguistic approaches
are more concerned with “how presuppositions
are inherited” than with “what presuppositions
are”. Presuppositions are defined in terms
of plugs, holes, and filters [Karttunen, 1973],
consistency [Gazdar, 1979], uncontroversial-
ity [Soames, 1982], or hypothetical and sec-
ondary contexts [Kay, 1992], but nothing is said
about the logical framework into which they
may be expressed. An exception is Mercer’s
approach [1987]. He abandons the projection
method in favour of rules of inference in default
logic. Our main objection is to Mercer’s use of
natural disjunction as an exclusive disjunction,
3
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and the reduction of natural implication to logi-
cal equivalence. Mercer [1993] argued that this is
a consequence of the way he intended his “proof
by cases”, in which “the cases are taken from a
conjunctive statement, where the conjuncts are
the disjuncts in a classical proof”. He assumes
that this non-standard notion is the one that
must be used in nonmonotonic reasoning. But
this non-traditional analysis and the reduction of
natural implication to logical equivalence are not
representable within the logic itself. Hence, this
method is also a procedural one.
A different perspective is given by
Sandt [1992] and Zeevat [1992] for whom pre-
suppositions are understood as anaphoric expres-
sions that have internal structure and semantic
content. Because they have more semantic con-
tent than other anaphors, presuppositions are
able to create an antecedent in the case that the
discourse does not provide one. Van der Sandt
provides a computational method for presuppo-
sition resolution in an enhanced discourse repre-
sentation theory, while Zeevat gives a declarative
account for it using update semantics, but nei-
ther of the methods is able to accommodate the
cancellation of presupposition that is determined
by information added later to the discourse. A
simple ontology consisting only of existent and
nonexistent objects is inadequate for dealing with
fictions or objects that have unactualized ex-
istence. Therefore, sentences such as Sherlock
Holmes is smarter than any other detective or
The strike was averted cannot be represented in
their theories.
3. Reasoning in stratified logic
Stratified logic [Marcu, 1994] reflects a differ-
ent understanding of default reasoning phe-
nomena from that found in the classic litera-
ture [Reiter, 1980]. Instead of treating the notion
of defeasibility on consistency and justification-
based grounds, we conjecture that defeasible in-
ferences are “weaker” than classical entailments.
For the purpose of this paper, it is enough to con-
sider only a subset of stratified logic.
In first-order stratified logic, a stratified inter-
pretation SL consists of an universe of objects
U and a function mapping F as in first-order
logic, but the relation set is partitioned accord-
ing to the strength (undefeasible and defeasible
relations) and polarity (positive and negative re-
lations). Thus, the set of relations R will be
given by the union Ru ∪ Ru ∪ Rd ∪ Rd where
Ru stands for positive undefeasible relations, Ru
for negative undefeasible relations, Rd for posi-
tive defeasible relations, and Rd for negative de-
feasible relations. Positive atomic formulas and
negative (negated) atomic formulas are labelled
as defeasible (e.g. pd(t1, . . . , tn)) or undefeasi-
ble (e.g. ¬pu(t1, . . . , tn)) and compound formulas
are obtained from positive and negative atomic
formulas using classical logical connectors. For
example, one would formalize that uttering that
John does not regret that Mary came to the party
presupposes that Mary came to the party as
¬regretu(John, come(Mary, party))→
comed(Mary, party)
(1)
because Mary came to the party is defeasible:
John does not regret that Mary came to the party
because she did not come.
At the semantic level, we extend the notion
of satisfiability to the two levels we have intro-
duced; hence, we will have u-satisfiability, |=u,
and d-satisfiability, |=d.
Definition 3.1 Assume σ is an SL valuation
such that tσ
i
= di ∈ D and assume that SL maps
n-ary predicates p to relations R ⊂ D × . . . × D.
For any atomic formula px(t1, . . . , tn), and any
stratified valuation σ, where x ∈ {u, d} and ti are
terms, the x-satisfiability relations are defined as
follows:
• σ |=u pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
u
• σ |=u pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
u∪Ru∪Rd
• σ |=d pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
d
• σ |=d pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
d
For any negation of an atomic formula
¬px(t1, . . . , tn), and any stratified valuation σ,
where x ∈ {u, d} and ti are terms, the x-
satisfiability relations are defined as follows:
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• σ |=u ¬pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Ru
• σ |=u ¬pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ R
u∪Ru∪Rd
• σ |=d ¬pu(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Rd
• σ |=d ¬pd(t1, . . . , tn) iff
〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Rd
The x-satisfiability relation for compound for-
mulas is defined in the usual way. One can
see that this definition of satisfiability has two
major advantages: on one hand, the |=u rela-
tion provides a high degree of liberty in satis-
fying sets of formulas that contain positive and
negative information of different strengths; on
the other hand the |=d relation is able to sig-
nal when such a contradiction occurs. For ex-
ample, in accordance with the above definition,
the theory {¬pu(t1, . . . , tn), p
d(t1, . . . , tn)} is u-
satisfiable but is not d-satisfiable. That means de-
feasible and undefeasible information are allowed
to co-exist because the satisfiability relations are
able to handle them appropriately.
Stratified logic uses an extension of semantic
tableaux that is both sound and complete to com-
pute the models associated with a given theory.
On a set of model schemata, we define a partially
ordered relation (≤) that yields the most opti-
mistic schemata for the theory, i.e., those that
contain more information and whose information
is as defeasible as possible. For example, a trans-
lation in stratified logic of the classical example
involving Tweety (represented by the constant T )
will yield three model schemata. Schemam1 does
not cancel the fact that Tweety flies as schemam2
does. Moreover, m1 contains more information
than m3. Therefore, m1 is the most optimistic
model schema.


birdu(T )
(∀x)(birdu(x)→ fliesd(x))
(∀x)(penguinu(x) → birdu(x))
(∀x)(penguinu(x) → ¬fliesu(x))
Schema# Indefeasible Defeasible
m1 bird
u(T )
¬penguinu(T )
fliesd(T )
m2 bird
u(T )
¬penguinu(T )
¬fliesu(T ) fliesd(T )
m3 bird
u(T )
¬fliesu(T ) fliesd(T )
Model schema m1 corresponds to an SL struc-
ture defined over an universe that contains only
one object, T , and no function symbols. The rela-
tions defined on the universe are Ru = {bird(T )},
Ru = {penguin(T )} and Rd = {flies(T )}. For
the sake of compactness and clarity we repre-
sent stratified models as unions of relations par-
titioned according to their strength:
m1 = {bird
u(T ),¬penguinu(T )} ∪ {fliesd(T )}
The stratified semantic tableaux and the
model-ordering relations have been fully imple-
mented in Common Lisp using the Screamer
macro package that provides nondeterminis-
tic facilities [Siskind and McAllester, 1993a,
Siskind and McAllester, 1993b]. Our program
takes as input a logical representation of the
background knowledge and of an utterance, com-
putes the model schemata for the theory, and re-
turns the set of most optimistic schemata and
the presuppositions associated with a given ut-
terance in the case that they exist. Computing
the model schemata for a stratified theory can be
done within the same complexity bounds as in
first-order logic. The algorithm for determining
the most optimistic schemata is O(n2).
4. Presuppositions as defeasible in-
formation
4.1. Methodological principles for our ap-
proach
The approach to nonexistent objects and pre-
suppositions that we are going to present is
constructed on the basis of a modified set of
Meinongian principles about nonexistence. They
are embedded in a stratified logic framework in
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which quantifiers are taken under Lejewski’s un-
restricted interpretation. The ontology is en-
hanced with the eight types of existence listed by
Hirst [1991], though in this paper, we will deal
only with physical existence, represented as E!,
unactualized existence, represented as UE!, ex-
istence outside the world but with causal inter-
action with that world, EOW !, and existence in
fiction, F !.
Following Rapaport’s style [1985], we pro-
pose a set of methodological principles based on
Meinong [1904] that are meant to capture the
ability of an intelligent agent to deal with exis-
tence and nonexistence rather from a conversa-
tional perspective than from a rational one.
MC1. Every uttered sentence is “directed” to-
wards an “object”, because every uttered
sentence can be seen as a materialization
of a mental act.
MC2. All uttered sentences exist (technically,
“have being”). However, this does not
imply the existence of their referents,
which are “ausserseiend” (beyond being
and non-being).
MC3. It is not self-contradictory to deny, nor
tautologous to affirm, the existence of a
referent.
MC4. Every referent and every uttered sentence
has properties.
MC5. The principles MC2 and MC4 are not in-
consistent.
Corollary: Even referents of an uttered
sentence that do not exist have proper-
ties.
MC6. (a) Every set of properties (Sosein) corre-
sponds to the utterance of a sentence.
(b) Every object of thought can be ut-
tered.
MC7. Some referents of an utterance are incom-
plete (undetermined with respect to some
properties).
In accordance with Grice [1975], we need two
additional principles:
GC1. The speaker is committed to the truth of
the sentences he utters.
GC2. Using and deriving presuppositions re-
quires, from both speaker and listener, a
sort of “optimism”.
Principle GC1 is formalized by the translation
of the uttered sentences into classical logic for-
mulas in which quantifiers are read under their
unrestricted interpretation. Principle GC2 is for-
malized by the rules containing defeasible infor-
mation that exist in the knowledge base of the
speaker and the hearer, and the notion of opti-
mism in the model-ordering relation. For exam-
ple, a factive negation weakly implies the truth
of its complement (see formula 1 above). Note
that a non-optimistic interpretation of utterances
will never be able to account for any of the prag-
matic inferences, because they are not explicitly
uttered.
4.2. Formalizing presuppositions
We assume that our inference process relies not
only on core knowledge as in “all men are mortal”
or “birds fly”, but also on knowledge of language
use as in “a factive negation weakly implies the
truth of its complement” as shown in formula 1.
That definite references imply the existence
of their referents constitutes another instance of
defeasible inference (see examples (4)—(7)). We
can capture this either by adding a new formula
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
to our knowledge base, and by embedding syn-
tactic terms into the logical form, as Hobbs
did [1985], or by representing this defeasible com-
mitment explicitly in the translation of each ut-
terance containing a definite reference or proper
noun. Both approaches exhibit the same seman-
tic behavior, and due to the model-ordering re-
lation they explain our commitment to a refer-
ent’s existence (in the case that we do not know
otherwise). Because definite reference(x) is syn-
tactic information, we depict it using a different
font, but the reader should understand that x is
bound by the same quantifier as x is, and that
definite reference(x) is used as a metalogical sym-
bol that triggers pragmatic inferences.
6
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As a last step, we abandon the Fregean read-
ing of the quantifiers and we adopt Lejewski’s un-
restricted interpretation [1954]. This means that
∃ and ∀ do not mix quantification with ontolog-
ical commitment: (∃x)object(x) does not entail
the physical existence of x, so the things we can
talk about equals the things we can quantify over.
This yields the following:
Definition: Presuppositions are defeasible in-
formation that is derived from knowledge of lan-
guage use and that is included in the most opti-
mistic models of a theory described in terms of
stratified logic under an unrestricted interpreta-
tion of the quantifiers.
4.3. What the approach can do with existent
and nonexistent objects
Assume that someone utters the sentence The
king of Buganda is (not) bald. If we know nothing
about Buganda and its king, the complete theory
of this utterance and the available knowledge in
stratified logic is this:


(∃x)(king of bugandau(x)∧
definite reference(x) ∧ (¬)baldu(x))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
This theory has one optimistic model that reflects
one’s commitment to the king’s existence. The
king’s existence has the status of defeasible infor-
mation; it is derived using knowledge of language
use and is a presupposition of the utterance.
m = {king of bugandau(ξ0), (¬)bald
u(ξ0)}
∪ {E!d(ξ0)}
Knowledge about the political system of
France can inhibit the inference regarding the ex-
istence of its king in a sentence such as The king
of France is (not) bald. Assume that we know
there is no king of France (¬E!u). A complete
formalization follows:


(∃x)(king of franceu(x) ∧ definite reference(x)
∧(¬)baldu(x))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
(∀x)(king of franceu(x)→ ¬E!u(x))
For this theory, we obtain only one model schema:
Schema # Indefeasible Defeasible
m1 king of france
u(ξo)
(¬)baldu(ξ0)
¬E!u(ξ0) E!
d(ξ0)
One can notice that the existential presupposition
is now cancelled by some background knowledge.
The only way one can satisfy the initial theory is
if she has a stratified structure where ¬E!u(ξ0).
Thus, the theory yields one model
m = {king of franceu(ξ0), (¬)bald
u(ξ0),
¬E!u(ξ0)} ∪ Ø
d
Asserting existence or nonexistence affects de-
feasible inferences due to knowledge of language
use and restricts some of the models. If someone
utters The king of Buganda exists and we know
nothing about Buganda, the translation


(∃x)(king of bugandau(x) ∧ definite reference(x)
∧E!u(x))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
gives one model:
m = {king of bugandau(ξ0), E!
u(ξ0)} ∪ Ø
d
If we know that the king of Buganda does not
exist, or in other words we evaluate the above
sentence against a knowledge base that contains
(∀x)(king of bugandau(x)→ ¬E!u(x)),
there is no model for this theory, so the utterance
is interpreted as false. It is noteworthy that the
inconsistency appears due to specific knowledge
about the king’s physical existence and not be-
cause of a quantification convention as in classical
first-order logic. On the other hand, the negation,
The king of Buganda does not exist, is consistent
with the knowledge base and provides this model:
m = {king of bugandau(ξ0),¬E!
u(ξ0)} ∪ Ø
d
So far, we have emphasized the way presup-
positions of definite references can be handled in
this framework. However, the proposed method
is general in the sense that it captures the other
presuppositional environments as well. Moreover,
the cancellation can occur at any moment in dis-
course. Consider for example the utterance John
7
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does not regret that Mary came to the party. Its
formalization in stratified logic follows:


(¬regretu(john, come(mary, party))∧
definite reference(john)∧
definite reference(mary)∧
definite reference(party)
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
(∀x, y, z)(¬regretu(x, come(y, z))
→ comed(y, z))
The optimistic model computed by our program
is this:
m = {¬regretu(john, come(mary, party))} ∪
{E!d(john), E!d(mary), E!d(party),
comed(mary, party)}
This model reflects our intuitions thatMary came
to the party and all definite references exist.
If one utters now Of course he doesn’t. Mary
did not come to the party, the new model com-
puted by our program will reflect the fact that a
presupposition has been cancelled, even though
this cancellation occurred later in the discourse.
Thus, the new optimistic model will be this:
m = {¬regretu(john, come(mary, party)),
¬comeu(mary, party)} ∪
{E!d(john), E!d(mary), E!d(party)}
Our approach correctly handles references to
unactualized objects such as averted strikes or the
paper that we had wanted to submit to AAAI-94.
The utterance The strike was averted can be for-
malized thus:


(∃x)(strikeu(x) ∧ definite reference(x)
∧avertedu(x))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
(∀x)(avertedu(x)→ UE!u(x))
(∀x)(UE!u(x)→ ¬E!u(x))
This gives one optimistic model:
m = {strikeu(ξ0), averted
u(ξ0),¬E!
u(ξ0),
UE!u(ξ0)} ∪ Ø
d
5. A comparison with Parsons’s and
Hobbs’s work
5.1. On Parsons’s evidence for his theory of
nonexistence
Parsons argues that is impossible to distinguish
between the shape of the logical form of two sen-
tences like these, in which one subject is fictional
and the other is real:
a. Sherlock Holmes is more fa-
mous than any other detective.
b. Pele´ is more famous than any
other soccer player.
In our approach, similar syntactic translations
give different semantic models when interpreted
against different knowledge bases. A complete
theory for the first sentence is this:


(∃x)(sherlock holmesu(x) ∧ definite reference(x)
∧(∀y)((detectiveu(y) ∧ (x 6= y))→
more famousu(x, y)))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
(∀x)(sherlock holmesu(x)→ F !u(x))
(∀x)(F !u(x) → ¬E!u(x))
This theory gives only one model:
m = {sherlock holmesu(ξ0),¬E!
u(ξ0), F !
u(ξ0),
detectiveu(y),more famousu(ξ0, y)} ∪Ø
d
This corresponds to an object ξ0 that does not ex-
ist in the real world but exists as a fiction, has the
property of being Sherlock Holmes, and for any
other object y, real or fictional that has the prop-
erty of being a detective, the object ξ0 is more
famous than object y. Of course, in this model,
it is impossible to commit ourselves to Holmes’s
physical existence, but is possible to talk about
him.
The theory for the second sentence is this:


(∃x)(peleu(x) ∧ definite reference(x)∧
(∀y)((soccer playeru(y) ∧ (x 6= y))→
more famousu(x, y)))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
This theory exhibits one optimistic model:
m = {peleu(ξ0), soccer player
u(y),
more famousu(ξ0, y)} ∪ {E
d!(ξ0)}
Model m states that the object ξ0, being Pele´, ex-
ists in a defeasible sense and this is the existential
presupposition of the initial utterance.
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As seen, it is needless to mention the exis-
tence of specific objects in the knowledge base.
The model-ordering relation rejects anyhow mod-
els that are not optimistic. In this way, the com-
mitment to Pele´’s existence is preserved, and ap-
pears as a presupposition of the utterance. Par-
sons’s theory provides different logical forms for
the above sentences, but fails to avoid the com-
mitment to nonexistent objects.
5.2. A comparison with Hobbs’s work
We have mentioned that Hobbs’s transparency
pertains to relations and not to objects. In our
approach, a sentence such as Ross worships Zeus
can be satisfied by a set of semantic models that
correspond to each possible combination of the
existence and non-existence of Ross and Zeus.

(∃x)(∃y)(rossu(x) ∧ zeusu(y) ∧ worshipu(x, y)
∧definite reference(x) ∧ definite reference(y))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
Among them, only one is minimal: the one that
explains the commitment to both Ross’s and
Zeus’s existence.
m = {rossu(ξ0), zeus
u(ξ1), worship
u(ξ0, ξ1)}
∪ {E!d(ξ0), E!
d(ξ1)}
But let us assume we know that there is no en-
tity in the real world that enjoys the property of
being Zeus, but rather one who exists outside the
real world as a god (EOW !u).


(∃x)(∃y)(rossu(x) ∧ zeusu(y) ∧ worshipu(x, y)
∧definite reference(x) ∧ definite reference(y))
(∀x)(definite reference(x) → E!d(x))
(∀x)(zeusu(x)→ EOW !u(x))
(∀x)(EOW !u(x) → ¬E!u(x))
This theory is no longer satisfiable by a model in
which Zeus exists as a physical entity. However,
the optimistic model explains our commitment to
Ross’s existence.
m = {rossu(ξ0), zeus
u(ξ1),¬E!
u(ξ1), EOW !
u(ξ1),
worshipu(ξ0, ξ1)} ∪ {E!
d(ξ0)}
6. Conclusion
Joining Meinong’s philosophy of nonexistence
with Grice’s conversational principles provides a
very strong motivation for a uniform treatment
of linguistic presuppositions. Lejewski’s unre-
stricted interpretation of the quantifiers, Hirst’s
ontology, and the notion of reasoning with strat-
ified tableaux and model-ordering in stratified
logic provide the formal tools to implement the
principles. This amounts to a model-theoretic
definition for presuppositions that is able to of-
fer a uniform treatment for linguistic presupposi-
tions and an explanation for the existential com-
mitment. A computationally tractable method
can be derived from the formalism. Its imple-
mentation in Common Lisp finds the natural lan-
guage presuppositions, including the existential
ones, and correctly reflects their cancellation.
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